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Abstract
We analyze the impact of immigration on the host country within a search and
matching model that allows for skill heterogeneity, endogenous skill acquisition, dif-
ferential search cost between immigrants and natives, capital-skill complementarity
and dierent degree of substitutability between unskilled natives and immigrants.
Within such a framework, we nd that although immigration raises the overall wel-
fare, it may have distributional eects. Specically, skilled workers gain in terms of
both employment and wages. Unskilled workers, on the other hand, gain in terms
of employment but may lose in terms of wages. Nevertheless, in one version of
the model, where unskilled workers and immigrants are imperfect substitutes, we
nd that even the unskilled wage may rise. These results accommodate conicting
empirical ndings.
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\Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!"
From The New Colossus
By Emma Lazarus
(The poem appears on an engraved
plaque by the Statue of Liberty).
1 Introduction
The impact of immigration on the labor market outcomes in the host country has long
been a subject of debate among economists. The standard model of a competitive labor
market oers a clear and intuitive prediction: immigration should lower the marginal
product and thus the wage of natives that compete with immigrants; it should also raise
the marginal product and the wage of natives whose labor is complementary to that
of immigrant workers. Nevertheless, the results provided by a large number of careful
empirical studies on this subject are often contradictory. For example, Borjas (2003) and
Borjas et al. (2010) nd a large negative wage eect on natives, whereas Card (2009)
and Ottaviano and Peri (2010) nd this eect to be relatively small, suggesting that
other features, not captured by the standard competitive model, may be responsible for
\counter-balancing" eects.1
Given that the literature has not yet reached a consensus, in this paper we revisit
the question of the impact of immigration, but adopt a dierent approach. We conduct
our analysis within a model that belongs to the general family of search and matching
models of the labor market (e.g., Diamond, 1982 and Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). In
this class of models unemployment exists due to search frictions and job entry responds
endogenously to the incentives provided by the market. Thus, contrary to the competitive
paradigm, our approach allows for the analysis of the unemployment and wage eects that
come from the impact of changes in the availability of jobs on the bargaining position of
workers. An additional advantage of our model is that it incorporates features that can
provide theoretical rationale for both positive and negative eects of immigration. Thus,
1See also Ortega and Verdugo (2010) for positive impact of immigration on the wages of competing
natives and Kugler and Yuksel (2008) for recent evidence that immigrants have no wage or employment
eect on natives.
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it encompasses both views found in the literature and allows us to study the impact of
immigration in a more systematic way.
Aside from explicitly taking into account the eects that come from the impact of
immigration on job creation, our model has the following key features. First, the pres-
ence of dierential search costs between natives and immigrants, besides adding further
realism to the model, is a key factor in explaining the equilibrium wage gap between
otherwise identical native and immigrant workers. This feature allows for the possibility
that immigration improves the employment and wage prospects of competing natives.
This is so because an immigration inux lowers the wages rms need to pay on average,
leading to more job entry. Second, we allow for heterogeneity in terms of skills among
native workers as well as between natives and immigrants. This allows us to analyze
distributional eects of immigration on dierent skill groups. Third, we consider endoge-
nous skill acquisition on behalf of native workers, which gives them the opportunity to
react to the negative pressure of immigration on wages and unemployment. Fourth, the
presence of capital as an independent factor of production serves as an additional channel
of adjustment to immigration-induced changes in labor supply. Finally, our model adopts
a generalized production technology that allows for the analysis of the impact of immi-
gration under dierent assumptions regarding the degrees of capital-skill and across-skill
complementarity.
We calibrate the model to the US economy and nd that the impact of an increase
in the number of unskilled immigrants on the overall welfare of natives is positive. As
expected, it lowers the unemployment and raises the wage rate of skilled native workers,
mainly because it encourages skilled job entry by raising the marginal product of skilled
labor. However, we also nd that it encourages unskilled job entry, leading to a smaller
unemployment rate for unskilled workers as well. The increase in unskilled job entry is due
to rms anticipating that, with a higher number of immigrants searching for jobs, they
will have to pay lower wages on average. As regards the wage of unskilled native workers,
on the one hand, the higher availability of unskilled jobs strengthens their bargaining
position and pushes their wage up. On the other hand, the fall in their marginal product
due to higher competition from immigrants causes their wage to fall. In our baseline
calibration we let unskilled immigrants and natives be perfect substitutes in production
and nd the overall impact on the wage of unskilled natives to be negative. However,
once we allow for a lower degree of substitutability between natives and immigrants we
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nd the impact on unskilled natives to be positive not only in terms of unemployment
but also in terms of wages.
We also compare the results under the assumption that the proportion of skilled na-
tive workers is xed, to those obtained when the proportion of skilled natives responds
endogenously to immigration-induced changes in the relative supply of skills. This com-
parison allows us to make an inference regarding the short-run versus the long-run eects
of immigration. We nd that the presence of endogenous skill acquisition has a positive
and signicant impact on the overall welfare of natives, mainly because it improves the
impact of unskilled immigration on unskilled natives. Specically, due to intensied com-
petition from unskilled immigrants, a higher share of the native population chooses to
become skilled. This acts to mitigate the negative competition eect on the productivity
of unskilled workers, but also to lower the positive impact on the productivity of skilled
workers, thereby improving the impact on the former, but worsening that on the latter.
This result suggests that, compared to the short-run, the long-run eects of unskilled
immigration tend to be less negative to competing and less positive to complementary
native workers.
Although there is a vast empirical literature on this topic, the number of studies that
analyze immigration within theoretical frameworks is small. Most of the earlier dynamic
theoretical studies employ the standard neoclassical growth model; examples include,
but are not limited to, Hazari and Sgro (2003), Ben-Gad (2004), Moy and Yip (2006)
and Ben-Gad (2008). To the best of our knowledge, the only other papers that analyze
immigration within frameworks that allow for labor market search frictions are those of
Ortega (2000) and Liu (2010). The former considers a two-country model where workers
decide whether to search in their own country or immigrate. He shows that Pareto-
ranked multiple steady-state equilibria may arise with or without immigration. Ortega's
analysis also takes into account the positive impact of immigration on job entry due to
rms anticipating that they will pay lower wages to immigrants that have higher search
costs. However, the model in Ortega assumes that worker productivity is constant and
therefore independent of immigration inux. Moreover, in his framework there is only
one labor type. Thus, his analysis overlooks both the negative competitive eects on
the marginal product of native workers and the across-skill externalities that arise when
otherwise identical natives and immigrants compete for the same types of jobs.
Liu (2010) concentrates on the welfare eects of illegal immigration within a dynamic
3
general equilibrium model with search frictions. The presence of search frictions allows
him to identify a new channel through which immigration can alter domestic consumption:
intensied job competition from illegal immigrants lowers the job nding rate of native
workers and forces them to accept lower wages. Our model is closer to an extended version
of his baseline model, where there are two types of domestic labor in constant numbers,
namely skilled and unskilled, and illegal immigrants belong to the unskilled group. In
this extended model, illegal immigration has a positive impact on skilled, but a negative
impact on unskilled natives, both in terms of employment and wages, mainly because it
raises the marginal product of the former group and lowers that of the latter.
As regards the production technology, the main dierence between our model and
Liu's extended model is that we employ a nested CES aggregator that allows for skilled
labor to be more complimentary to capital than unskilled labor, whereas Liu assumes a
Cobb-Douglas production function, which implies that the types of labor are equally com-
plementary to capital. Furthermore, Liu's extended model assumes that immigrants and
natives are perfect substitutes in production, while we also explore the case of imperfect
substitutability between the two labor types. Our assumptions regarding the production
technology are closer to those of Ben-Gad (2008) who analyzes a neo-classical growth
model with overlapping dynasties and two types of labor, but does not allow for search
frictions. He shows that, because of capital-skill complementarity, skilled immigration is
far more benecial to the economy than unskilled.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model.
Section 3 denes the steady-state equilibrium and analyzes its existence and uniqueness.
In Section 4, we analyze two special cases of the model. In the rst, we assume that
there are no dierences in search costs between otherwise identical native and immigrant
workers. In the second, we assume dierential search costs, but let the two labor inputs
(skilled and unskilled) be perfect substitutes to each other. Considering these two cases
separately allows us to identify two dierent channels through which immigration can
aect labor market outcomes: one that comes from the impact on rms' expected cost
of establishing an employment relationship and one that comes from the impact on the
prices of labor inputs. In Section 5 we calibrate the model and present simulation results
in the general case when both of these channels are present. In Section 6 we examine
the sensitivity of our results to alternative parameterizations of the production function.
We also consider the behavior of an extended version of the model where natives and
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immigrants of the same skill type are assumed to be imperfect substitutes. Finally, Section
7 oers some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We construct a search and matching model with two intermediate inputs and one nal
consumption good. Time is continuous and begins at t = 0: The economy is populated
by a continuum of workers and a continuum of jobs. Workers are either natives (N) or
immigrants (I): The mass of natives is normalized to unity, while that of immigrants
is denoted by I and is determined exogenously. The mass of jobs, on the other hand,
is determined endogenously as part of the equilibrium. All agents are risk neutral and
discount the future at a common rate r > 0; which is equal to the interest rate. The rest
of this section oers a detailed description of the model; see also Figure 1 for a graphic
presentation of its basic structure.
2.1 Workers and Firms
Native workers are either skilled (H) or unskilled (L): Investment in human capital/skill
is a discrete choice. Before entering the labor market each agent decides whether to invest
in education and become skilled or remain unskilled.2 Native young agents dier with
respect to their ability to learn, which in turn determines their cost of acquiring education.
Older agents, on the other hand, face an additional cost, which is prohibitive. Thus, older
workers never opt for training.
Let the cost of acquiring training be denoted by z and assume that it is distributed
uniformly over the closed interval [0; z]: A native young agent j will invest in education
if the benet from this decision exceeds the cost. More specically, let JUHN and J
U
LN
denote the discounted values associated with the state where a native unemployed worker
is skilled and unskilled, respectively. Then a native young worker j will invest in education
if
JUHN   JULN > zj:
Thus, all agents with a cost of education lower than z will invest in education, where z
is given by
z = JUHN   JULN :
2We use the terms skilled (unskilled) workers and high- (low-) skill workers interchangeably.
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Let  be the fraction of the native workers that are unskilled and 1    the fraction of
those that are skilled. Then, in equilibrium the proportion of the skilled natives is given
by
1   = z

z
: (1)
Immigrants, on the other hand, can be either skilled or unskilled, but their numbers,
denoted by IH and IL, respectively, are determined exogenously. Also, all workers are
born and die at the rate n:
Our production side borrows some elements from Acemoglu (2001). Firms operate
either in one of the two intermediate sectors or in the nal sector. The two intermediate
sectors produce inputs YH and YL using skilled and unskilled labor, respectively. More
specically, each of these two sectors operates a linear technology, which, through normal-
ization of units, can be written as Yi = i; i = H;L; that is, the output of an intermediate
input is equal to the number of workers employed. These intermediate inputs are non-
storable. Once produced, they are sold in competitive markets and are immediately used
for the production of the nal good (Y ).
Next we turn to the nal good sector. Motivated by a series of empirical papers
(see, among others, Griliches 1969 and Krusell et al. 2000), which support the idea that
skilled labor is relatively more complimentary to capital than unskilled labor, we post the
following production technology for the nal good
Y = [Y L + (1  )Q]1=;   1; (2)
with
Q = [xK + (1  x)Y H ]1=;   1; (3)
where K denotes capital, a and x are positive parameters that govern income shares and
 and  drive the elasticities of substitution between capital and the unskilled input and
capital and the skilled input, respectively. Thus, the production function is a two-level
CES function in which capital (K) and the skilled input (YH) are nested together in the
sub-aggregate input Q given by equation (3) and then Q and the unskilled input (YL)
enter the main production function (equation 2). Capital-skill complementarity is dened
as  > ; which implies that an increase in the capital stock raises the skill premium (see,
among others, Krusell et al. 2000 and Polgreen and Silos 2008). If either  or  equals
zero, then the corresponding nesting is Cobb-Douglas.
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Since the two intermediate inputs are sold in competitive markets, their prices, pL and
pH ; will be equal to their marginal products, that is
pL = Y
 1
L Y
1 ; (4)
and
pH = (1  )(1  x)Y  1H Q Y 1 : (5)
We assume that there exists a competitive capital market in which each rm can buy
and sell capital without delay. Hence, only lled vacancies will buy capital. In addition,
since the market is competitive, the marginal product of capital is equal to its rental price
(pK); which is in turn equal to the interest rate (r) plus the depreciation rate (). Thus,
pK = (1  )xK 1Q Y 1  = r + : (6)
2.2 Search and Matching
From now on we dispense with the Walrasian auctioneer and assume that in each of the
two labor markets unemployed workers and unlled vacancies are brought together via a
stochastic matching technologyM(Ui; Vi); where Ui and Vi denote respectively the number
of unemployed workers and vacancies of skill type i: This function M(:) exhibits standard
properties: it is at least twice continuously dierentiable, increasing in its arguments,
exhibits constant returns to scale and satises the familiar Inada conditions. Using the
property of constant returns to scale, we can write the ow rate of a match for a worker as
M(Ui; Vi)=Ui = m(i) and the ow rate of a match for a vacancy as M(Ui; Vi)=Vi = q(i),
where i = Vi=Ui = m(i)=q(i) is an indicator of the tightness prevailing in labor market
i. Also, the above-mentioned assumptions on M imply the following properties for m(:)
and q(:):
m0(i) > 0; lim
i!0
m(i) = 0; lim
i!1
m(i) =1; (7)
q0(i) < 0; lim
i!0
q(i) =1; and lim
i!1
q(i) = 0: (8)
Firms post either high-skill vacancies, which are suited for skilled workers, or low-skill
vacancies, which are suited for unskilled workers. Each rm posts at most one vacancy
and the number of rms of each type is determined endogenously by free entry. Firms can
choose to open either skilled or unskilled vacancies, but cannot ex-ante open vacancies
suited only for natives or immigrants. A vacant rm bears a cost ci; i = H;L; specic to
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its type. On the other hand, an unemployed worker of type i receives a ow of income
bi; which can be consider as the opportunity cost of employment. There is no cross-skill
matching. High skill workers direct their search towards the high-skill sector and low-
skill workers towards the low-skill sector. Also, for simplicity, we assume that creating a
vacancy is costless, although this can be easily amended following, for example, Acemoglu
(2001) and Laing et al. (2003).
The instant a vacancy and a worker make contact, they bargain over the division of
any surplus. The skill level of the worker as well as the output that will result from a
match is known to both parties. We assume that wages are determined by an asymmetric
Nash bargaining, where the worker has bargaining power : After an agreement has been
reached, production commences immediately. If at any point in time an employee dies,
rms re-enter the labor market and search for a new employee, assuming that they nd
it protable to do so. Moreover, we assume that matches dissolve at the rate si; specic
to the type of the worker. Following a separation, the worker and the vacancy enter the
corresponding market and search for new trading partners.
In addition, unemployed workers are subject to a per unit of time \search" cost, hij;
which is specic to the worker's origin j = N; I, where N denotes \native" and I denotes
\immigrant." We assume that immigrants have a search cost that is at least as high as
that of natives; that is, hiI  hiN . There are several reasons why an immigrant may face
a higher search cost or equivalently a lower income while being unemployed searching for
a job. In addition to the problems that one may encounter if being in a foreign country
(e.g., lack of a social network, lower language prociency, etc.) lower income may result if
immigrants do not qualify for the same unemployment insurance benets as the natives.3
Without loss of generality we assume that hiN = 0; i = H;L:Moreover, in what follows we
concentrate our attention to the impact of changes in the number of unskilled immigrants
(IL), while keeping the number of skilled immigrants (IH) xed. Without loss of generality
we therefore also set hHI = 0.
3Illegal immigrants are often not eligible for any unemployment insurance benets. Also, in the U.S.,
for example, legal immigrants qualify for unemployment insurance benets that are covered by the state
governments and last for 26 weeks. Nevertheless, not all of them qualify for benets, covered by the
federal government, that extend beyond the 26-week period and are paid during times of recession (see,
for example, NELP 2002).
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2.3 Asset Value Functions
At any point in time a worker is either employed (E) or unemployed (U): Likewise a
vacancy is either lled (F ) or else is looking for a worker (V ): We denote the discounted
value associated with each state by Jij, where once again the subscript i = H;L denotes
the skill type (high- or low-skill), the subscript j = N; I denotes the origin (native or im-
migrant), and the superscript  = V; U; F;E; indicates the state (vacant rm, unemployed
worker, lled job, employed worker). Then in steady state:
rJVi =  ci + q(i)

iJ
F
iN + (1  i)JFiI   JVi

; (9)
rJFij = pi   wij   (si + n)

JFij   JVi

; (10)
(r + n)JUij = bi   hij +m(i)

JEij   JUij

; (11)
(r + n)JEij = wij   si

JEij   JUij

; (12)
where i is the fraction of workers of skill type i that are natives and hij = 0 if i = H
or j = N . Also, wij denotes the wage rate for a worker of skill type i = H;L and origin
j = N; I: Expressions such as these have, by now, a familiar interpretation. For instance
consider JVi : The term rJ
V
i is the ow value accrued to an unmatched vacancy of type i:
it equals the loss from maintaining a vacant position plus the ow probability of becoming
matched with a worker of the same type multiplied by the expected capital gain from such
an event. The other asset value equations posses similar interpretation.
As there is free entry and exit on the rm side in each intermediate input market, an
additional vacancy of skill type i should make expected net prot equal to zero, that is
JVi = 0: (13)
2.4 Nash Bargaining
Since all workers and rms are risk neutral, Nash bargaining implies that the wage rate
for a worker of skill type i and origin j; wij; must be such that:
(1  )(JEij   JUij ) = (JFij   JVi ): (14)
Equation (14) implies that rms get a share 1   and workers get  of the total surplus
Sij generated by a match, where
Sij = J
F
ij + J
E
ij   JUij   JVi :
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Hence,
JFij   JVi = (1  )Sij; (15)
JEij   JUij = Sij: (16)
2.5 Steady-State Composition of the Labor Force
Recall that IH and IL denote the number of skilled and unskilled immigrants. Thus, the
total number of skilled and unskilled workers in the economy is 1    + IH and  + IL,
respectively. Next by equating the ows out of unemployment to the sum of break ups
and new births, we can nd the steady-state employment, and hence the production of
each intermediate input (see the Appendix for the details):
YH =
m(H)(1  + IH)
n+ sH +m(H)
; (17)
YL =
m(L)(+ IL)
n+ sL +m(L)
: (18)
Similarly, the steady-state unemployment Uij of each type i = H;L and origin j = N; I
is given by:
UHN =
(n+ sH)(1  )
n+ sH +m(H)
; (19)
ULN =
(n+ sL)
n+ sL +m(L)
; (20)
UHI =
(n+ sH)IH
n+ sH +m(H)
; (21)
ULI =
(n+ sL)IL
n+ sL +m(L)
; (22)
UH = UHN + UHI =
(n+ sH)(1  + IH)
n+ sH +m(H)
(23)
UL = ULN + ULI =
(n+ sL)(+ IL)
n+ sL +m(L)
; (24)
Moreover, as mentioned above, the probability that a type-i and unemployed worker
is native is i, and is given by
H =
UHN
UH
=
1  
1  + IH : (25)
L =
ULN
UL
=

+ IL
: (26)
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3 Steady-State Equilibrium
Consider next the denition of a steady-state equilibrium for this economy.
Denition. A steady-state equilibrium is a set fH ; L; ; pH ; pL; pK ; wHN ; wLN ; wLI ;
wHI ; Y

H ; Y

L ; K
; UHN ; U

LN ; U

HI ; U

LIg such that
(i) Individuals decide optimally whether to invest in training or not by setting the cost of
training equal to its benet (equation 1).
(ii) The intermediate input markets clear. In particular, conditions (4) and (5) are satis-
ed.
(iii) The capital market clears; i.e., condition (6) is satised.
(iv) The free entry condition (13) for each skill type i is satised.
(v) The Nash bargaining optimality condition (14) for each skill type i and origin j holds.
(vi) The numbers of employed and unemployed workers as well as of lled and unlled
vacancies of each type and origin remain constant; i.e., among others, conditions (17)-(24)
are satised.
As shown in the Appendix, the steady-state equilibrium values of H ; L; ; are given
by the following reduced system of equations:


 + (1  )

AH
AL

[xk + (1  x)] 
 1 

= BL; (27)
(1  ) (1  x) [xk + (1  x)] 1 



AL
AH

[xk + (1  x)]   + (1  )
 1 

= BH ;
(28)
and
(1  )z = 1
r + n

m(H)pH + (r + n+ sH)bH
r + n+ sH + m(H)
  m(L)pL + (r + n+ sL)bL
r + n+ sL + m(L)

; (29)
where
Ai  m(i)
n+ si +m(i)
;   + IL
1  + IH ; k 
K
YH
= (BH)
1
1 

x
(1  x)(r + )
 1
1 
;
and
Bi  bi   (1  i)hiI + ci[r + n+ si + m(i)]
(1  )q(i) :
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Each of equations (27) and (28) is a zero expected prot condition in the unskilled
and skilled input market, respectively. The left-hand-side, which equals the price of input
i, pi; i = L;H; gives the revenue to the rm from employing a worker of skill type i, while
the right-hand-side gives the expected cost to the rm from establishing an employment
relationship. This includes the recruiting cost and the cost of being matched with a worker
of skill type i. We will refer to this in short as employment cost. Also, equation (29) sets
the cost to the last worker who receives training equal to the present value of the benet
from a such a decision. Obviously, all workers with a cost lower than the one given by the
left-hand side of (29) invest in education. Having determined H ; 

L; 
; we can get the
equilibrium values for the other variables by substituting in the appropriate equations. In
particular, the unemployment rates among the skilled and unskilled natives, and skilled
and unskilled immigrants, uHN ; u

LN ; u

HI and u

LI , follow from equations (19) to (24)
uHN = uHI = uH =
(n+ sH)
n+ sH +m(H)
and uLN = uLI = uL =
(n+ sL)
n+ sL +m(L)
: (30)
Finally, the wage rates wHN ; w

LN ; w

LI and w

HI are given by (see the derivation of equation
A8 in the Appendix)
wij =
[r + n+ si +m(i)]pi + (r + n+ si)(1  )(bi   hij)
r + n+ si + m(i)
: (31)
Proposition 1. If there is no search cost, i.e., hLI = 0 then, under certain parameter
restrictions conned in the Appendix, a steady-state equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proof. All formal proofs are presented in the Appendix.
The essence of Proposition 1 can be captured with the help of Figure 2. The equilibrium
values of H and L are given by the intersection of the two curves labeled as EP and OH.
The EP curve results after combining equations (27) and (28) (it is described by equation
A13 given in the Appendix). This curve comprises the set of values of H and L that yield
equal prot and make rms indierent between establishing a high-skill and a low-skill
vacancy. It has a negative slope since an increase in H will increase the employment cost
BH and thus will decrease the ratio (YH=YL), in order to restore the relation between pH
and BH : The decrease in (YH=YL) will decrease the marginal product of unskilled labor
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pL: To oset this, there must be a decrease in the cost of establishing a low-skill vacancy
BL; which requires a decrease in L:
4
The curve OH, on the other hand, is the geometric locus of values of H and L
that make the expected prot from establishing a high-skill vacancy equal to zero (it is
described by equation 28).5 It has a positive slope because an increase in H leads to a
higher employment cost (BH) and a lower price (pH) in the skilled sector. Hence, there
must be an increase in L, which will raise the price of the high-skill input (pH) and restore
the zero-prot condition pH = BH :
The result in Proposition 1 holds also in the case where unskilled immigrants face
a search cost (hLI > 0), but the proportion of skilled workers (1   ) is exogenously
determined.6 Nevertheless, if there is a search cost and endogenous skill accumulation,
then an increase in tightness in the high-skill sector H aects also the employment cost in
the low-skill sector BL through its eect on the proportion of skilled workers (1  ) and
hence on the probability that an unskilled and unemployed worker is native (L)(see the
expression for BL given above). Consequently, in this more general case, while the locus
OH in Figure 2 remains unchanged, the locus EP may not be monotonically decreasing
any more. Thus, even if an equilibrium exists, it may not be unique. However, we are
able to show that
Proposition 2. If the two intermediate inputs are perfect substitutes, i.e.,  = 1; then
a steady-state equilibrium exists and is unique even in the case where the proportion of
skilled workers (1  ) is endogenous and immigrants face a search costs (hLI > 0).
With the two inputs being perfect substitutes, their marginal products and hence
prices do not depend on the ratio YH=YL: This makes the curve EP in Figure 2 disappear.
The equilibrium can instead be presented using the zero prot condition for each of the two
intermediate sectors. More specically, since the marginal product of the high-skill sector
is independent of YL, the curve OH in Figure 2 becomes vertical on the horizontal axis;
this curve is relabeled HH and is shown in Figure 3: On the other hand, the zero prot
condition for the low-skill sector, depicted by curve LL in Figure 3, involves both L and
4In general the curvature of the EP locus cannot be determined; we draw it as a straight line for
simplicity.
5Note that we could have used instead the curve along which the expected prot of establishing a
low-skill vacancy is zero, as described by equation (27).
6The proof is essentially the same as that of Proposition 1, since the curves EP and OH in Figure 2
preserve all of their relevant properties.
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H ; an increase in the matching rate of the high-skill workers m(H), due to an increase in
H lowers the number of unskilled native workers  and increases the probability that an
unskilled and unemployed workers is immigrant (1   L). With hLI > 0, this lowers the
cost of establishing a low-skill job BL. Hence, to restore the zero prot condition, L must
rise. That is why the curve LL is drawn with a positive slope. Notice, however, that
if  is exogenously given then the zero prot condition for the low-skill sector becomes
independent of H : This case is represented by curve LL in Figure 3.
4 Comparative Static Resutls
In general a change in the number of unskilled immigrants (IL), can inuence the equi-
librium through the impact of such a change on i) prices pi and ii) expected employment
cost BL. Before analyzing the equilibrium in the general case, where a change in IL is
propagated through both of these channels, it is instructive to examine each case sepa-
rately. Specically, we analyze two special cases: rst, we set hLI = 0, so that there is no
dierence anymore between an unskilled native and immigrant worker. In other words,
this assumption implies that wij = wi for each j and hence a rm is indierent between
hiring an immigrant and a native worker. In this case, a change in IL has no impact on BL;
thus, it inuences the equilibrium only through its impact on prices. The second special
case that we analyze below is the one where hLI > 0 but the two intermediate inputs are
perfect substitutes ( = 1): In this case prices are independent of IL. Therefore, a change
in IL can aect the labor market outcomes only through its impact on BL. Naturally, it
follows that
Proposition 3. If there is no search cost (hLI = 0) and the two intermediate inputs
are perfect substitutes ( = 1), then the equilibrium is independent of the number of
immigrants.
If hLI = 0 and  = 1; then the equilibrium is given by the intersection of a curve that
is parallel to the horizontal axis (such as LL in Figure 3) and describes the zero-prot
condition in the low-skill sector, and a curve that is vertical to the horizontal axis and
describes the zero-prot condition in the high-skill sector (see curve HH in Figure 3).
Moreover, both curves are independent of the number of immigrants.
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4.1 Imperfect Substitutes and no Search Costs
Consider next the case where  < 1 and the search cost hLI is equal to zero. As mentioned
above, the latter assumption implies that there is no dierence between an unskilled native
worker and an immigrant and in particular wij = wi 8j: We begin with the case where
the fraction 1    of the native workers that are skilled is exogenously given and time
invariant. The equilibrium is then described by the system of equations (27) and (28),
with  and hence  being constant. Also, as shown in the Appendix, equation (31), which
gives the wage rates for each group, simplies to
wi = bi +

1  
ci
q(i)
[r + n+ si +m(i)]; i = H;L: (32)
Proposition 4. If there is no search cost and the proportion of skilled workers is exoge-
nously given, then
dH
dIL
> 0;
dL
dIL
< 0;
duH
dIL
< 0;
duL
dIL
> 0;
dwH
dIL
> 0 and
dwL
dIL
< 0:
An increase in the number of unskilled immigrants IL raises the productivity of skilled
labor and lowers that of unskilled labor since skilled and unskilled labor are Edgeworth
complements in production. Hence, the price of skilled input pH goes up, while the price
of unskilled input pL goes down. This induces the entry of skilled jobs and raises the
matching rate for the skilled workers m(H), but discourages the entry of unskilled jobs
and causes the matching rate for the unskilled workers m(L); to go down. In terms of
Figure 2, an increase in IL shifts the OH curve to the right (from OH to OH
0), but leaves
the curve EP unchanged. Given these changes in the ow probabilities, the rest of the
comparative statics follow easily; namely, an increase in the probability of nding a match
lowers the unemployment rate among skilled workers and raises their bargaining power
and hence their wage. The opposite holds for the unskilled workers.
Next we analyze the case where there is endogenous skill acquisition and hence the
fraction 1  of the native workers that are skilled is given by equation (29). We continue
to assume that all the search costs hij are equal to zero, which implies that there is still
no dierence between a native worker and an immigrant of a skill type i. The equilibrium
is now described by equations (27), (28) and the following simplied version of (29) (see
the Appendix for the details)
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(1  )z(r + n) = bH   bL + 
1   (cHH   cLL): (33)
The wage rate of each group is still given by equation (32). Consider the following
proposition.
Proposition 5. If there is no search cost and the proportion of skilled workers is deter-
mined endogenously, then
dH
dIL
> 0;
dL
dIL
< 0;
d
dIL
< 0;
duH
dIL
< 0;
duL
dIL
> 0;
dwH
dIL
> 0 and
dwL
dIL
< 0:
Moreover, the magnitude of these eects is smaller, in absolute value, compared with the
case where the proportion of skilled workers is xed.
The mechanism behind the results derived in Proposition 5 is the same as that in Proposi-
tion 4. Moreover, an increase in the number of unskilled immigrants raises the proportion
of skilled workers (1   ), since both the increase in H and the decrease in L raise the
benet of education. Interestingly, starting from the same equilibrium, with endogenous
changes in the skill distribution the increase in the matching rate of skilled workers m(H)
is lower compared to the case where  is xed. Similarly, the decrease in the matching
rate of unskilled workers m(L) is smaller when  is allowed to adjust. This occurs be-
cause the initial eects on the prices of the two inputs are mitigated through changes in
: More specically, when  is endogenous, more unskilled workers, caused by an increase
in unskilled immigration, induce (discourage) entry of skilled (unskilled) jobs as well as
a compositional shift in the native labor force towards skilled workers. This composi-
tional shift acts to mitigate the initial positive (negative) impact on the price of skilled
(unskilled) input. In terms of Figure 2, the curve EP remains unchanged but the shift
of the curve OH to the right is smaller compared with that in Proposition 4; e.g., the
curve shifts to OH 0 when  is xed but only to OH 0 when  is endogenously determined.
This has important implications because it makes the benets of unskilled immigration
to skilled labor (i.e., the decline in the unemployment rate and the increase in the wage
rate) smaller. Similarly, the losses of immigration to unskilled labor (i.e., the increase in
the unemployment rate and the fall in the wage rate) are also smaller.
4.2 Perfect Substitutes and Search Costs
In this subsection we analyze the other special case where  = 1 but hLI > 0. We begin
again with the case where  is exogenously given. Consider
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Proposition 6. If the two intermediate inputs are perfect substitutes, immigrants face
a search cost and the proportion of skilled workers is exogenously given, then
dH
dIL
= 0;
dL
dIL
> 0;
duH
dIL
= 0;
duL
dIL
< 0;
dwHN
dIL
=
dwHI
dIL
= 0 and
dwLN
dIL
> 0
If the proportion of skilled natives is endogenous, these eects have the same sign but
smaller in magnitude.
To understand the results summarized in Proposition 6 notice from equation (31) that
when hLI > 0 and hLN = 0 the wage rate of unskilled immigrants, is lower than that of
unskilled native workers; that is, wLI < wLN because immigrants are subject to higher
search costs. Intuitively, searching is costlier for immigrants, which forces them to accept
lower wages. For the rm, hiring an immigrant is therefore more protable than hiring
a native, given that they are both equally productive. It follows that the increase in
the immigrant's share of unskilled labor force lowers the expected employment cost in
the low-skill sector BL, by lowering the probability a rm will locate a native unskilled
worker L. This spurs low-skill job entry with a concomitant increase in the matching
rate for low-skill workers. Consequently, this leads to an increase in the wage of low-skill
native and immigrant workers wLN and wLI , given by equation (31), and a decrease in
their unemployment rate, given by the second equation in (30). Finally, the matching
rate for high-skill workers is given by (28). Note that if  = 1 then H is independent of
the number of unskilled immigrants. Consequently, the wage rate and the unemployment
rate for high-skill workers will remain the same. In terms of Figure 3, the curve that
depicts the locus of points along which prot is zero in the high-skill (low-skill) sector
are HH (LL): An increase in the number of unskilled immigrants leaves the rst curve
unchanged but shifts the second curve upwards (to L0L0):
In the case where  is endogenous, there will still be an increase in the matching
rate and the wage rate of low-skill workers as well as a decrease in their unemployment
rate. However, starting form the same equilibrium , as in the case where  is xed, these
eects are smaller in magnitude since the increase in wL will increase , which will oset
partially the initial increase in the matching rate L: The corresponding variables for
high-skill workers will still remain unchanged. Graphically in this case the equilibrium
can be presented as the intersection of the HH curve and a downward-sloping curve that
depicts the zero-prot condition in the low-skill sector (such as LL in Figure 3). An
increase in the number of unskilled immigrants leaves the rst curve unchanged but shifts
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the second curve upwards (to L0L
0
):
5 General Case
Next we analyze the equilibrium in the general case, where  < 1 and hLI > 0. In this
general case, a change in IL can inuence the equilibrium through the impact of such a
change on both prices and expected employment costs.
From our analysis above, we can infer that in the general case the impact of an increase
in the number of unskilled immigrants on skilled native workers will be unambiguously
positive both in terms of wages and unemployment. However, the impact on the unskilled
natives is in general ambiguous. As derived in Proposition 5, the price eect is negative,
while, as derived in Proposition 6, in the presence of dierential search costs the impact
is positive on unskilled natives. In this section we therefore calibrate the general model
with the aim to quantitatively assess the overall impact of unskilled immigration on the
labor market outcomes of unskilled natives, and in turn, on the overall welfare of natives.
For the results below it is useful to characterize our measure of natives' welfare. As
is the convention in these models, we measure welfare as the total steady-state output
net of total costs, i.e., the total steady-state surplus of the economy. To measure the
welfare of natives, we subtract from the total surplus the amount of output that accrues
to immigrants. We make the assumption that all rms belong to natives so that all the
prots net of the wages rms pay to immigrants accrue to natives. Thus, our measure of
native's welfare is the total steady-state surplus of the economy minus the wages paid to
immigrants, and is given by
eY = Y + bHUHN + bLULN   cHVH   cLVL   wHI(IH   UH)  wLI(IL   UL) (34)
It is equal to total ow of output, Y , plus the output-equivalent ow to native workers who
are not currently working, bHUHN+bLULN , minus the ow costs of job creation for skilled
and unskilled vacancies, cHVH and cLVL, respectively, minus the wages paid to currently
employed skilled and unskilled immigrants, given by wHI(IH   UH) and wLI(IL   UL),
respectively. In our simulation exercises below we also consider an alternative measure
of natives' welfare that does not include the income enjoyed by the unemployed: ~Y  
bHUHN   bLULN .
In what follows we rst describe the baseline calibration of the general model. The
general model's quantitative predictions are then discussed in order. We then examine the
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sensitivity of the predictions with respect to the production parameters  and . Finally,
we examine how the results change when we relax the assumption that unskilled natives
and immigrants are perfect substitutes in production.
5.1 Calibration
For simplicity and realism (see Blanchard and Diamond, 1991), in our calibration we use
a Cobb-Douglas matching function, M = U i V
1 
i , which exhibits standard properties.
The scale parameter  indexes the eciency of the matching process.
Our model economy is fully characterized by 20 parameters. The production param-
eters, ; ;  and x, the parameters in the matching function,  and , the job separation
rates, sL and sH , the unemployment ow incomes, bL and bH , the vacancy costs, cL and
cH , the depreciation rate, , the worker's bargaining power, , the population growth
rate, n, the upper bound of the cost of acquiring training z, the numbers of skilled and
unskilled immigrants, IL and IH , the search cost, hLN , and the discount rate r. One
period in the model economy represents one month, so all the parameters are interpreted
monthly. A summary of our calibration is given in Table 1.
First, we adopt the standard parameter values for the monthly interest rate, r = 0:004.
Following common practice, we set the unemployment elasticity to  = 0:5, which is within
the range of estimates reported in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), and also assume
 = 0:5, which internalizes the search externalities (Hosios, 1990). Shimer's (2005) data
give a mean value for 1960-2004 of 0.594 for the average job nding rate and 0.036 for the
average job separation rate. Moreover, the sample mean for the vacancy to unemployment
ratio between 1960-2006 was 0.72.7 We make use of the mean job nding rate, the mean
separation rate and the mean vacancy to unemployment ratio to derive values for sL; sH ,
and . The resulting values are sL = 0:040; sH = 0:024, and  = 0:715.
Following Krussell et al. (2000), we dene as skilled a worker with at least a Bachelor's
degree, and adopt their parameter estimates for the US economy,  = 0:0401 and  =
 0:495.8 The weights in the nested CES function are set to  = 0:538 and x = 0:800,
7This is derived in Pissarides (2009), using the Job Openings and Labor Tunover Survey (JOLTS) data
since December 2000 and the Help-Wanted Index (HWI) adjusted to the JOLTS units of measurement
before then.
8Given that we assume that there are only two distinct skill groups, the assumptions embodied in
our production technology (given in (2) and (3)) may seem relatively strong. They imply that workers
within each of the two skill groups are perfect substitutes. However, a variety of estimates based on US
data suggest that given our partition of workers into \high-school equivalents" and \college equivalents"
this simple two-skill model works. This evidence show that allowing for imperfect substitution between
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which imply an output-to-capital ratio of 0.36 and a share of labor in total output of
0.68. According to D'Adda and Scorcu (2003), the US output-to-capital ratio for the
period 1980-1992, ranges from 0.33 to 0.41. As for our targeted labor share, it lies within
the range of available estimates: 0.65-0.75.9 The rate of depreciation of capital is set to
 = 0:10, a value that it is consistent with most of the estimates for the US.10
The parameter z is taken to be 91.5 so that the average share of skilled labor force in
our model economy matches the average share of workers in the US labor force that have
a Bachelor's degree, of about 0.25. The numbers of skilled and unskilled immigrants are
set to IL = 0:142 and IH = 0:047 so that in our model economy 15:9% of the labor force
is foreign-born and 25% of the workers in the foreign-born labor force have a Bachelor's
degree. These measures come from the 2009 American Community Survey (ACS) data
tables of the US Census Bureau. We follow Ben-Gad (2008) and set n = 0:0067, which
the average US natural rate of population growth for the period 1991-2000.
Our chosen values for cL and cH are guided by the following observations. First, a
signicant part of the cost of lling a vacancy is the opportunity cost of labor eort
devoted to hiring activities. Hence, the recruiting cost should be compatible with labor
earnings. Since hiring is typically done by supervisors whose wage is at least as high as
the wages of new hires, recruiting for skilled jobs should be more costly than recruiting
for unskilled jobs. Second, recruiting costs cannot be too large relative to output. The
standard upper bound in the literature is 5% of output devoted in job creation activities.
Setting cL = 0:546 and cH = 0:819 results in 3% of output devoted to job creation
activities and obeys the other criterion. Specically, the average recruiting cost of a
skilled and an unskilled job is roughly equal to the monthly wage of a skilled and an
unskilled job, respectively.
We select values for bL and bH to match statistics from the simulated data to empir-
ical measures of, 1) the average US employment rate, and 2) the US college-plus wage
premium. We target an average employment rate of 0.93 and a skilled wage premium of
45%, consistent with the estimates reported in Goldin and Katz (2007). To match these
statistics we set bL = 0:339 and bH = 0:488. Together with our chosen values for cL
and cH , these values imply a replacement ratio in our model of 60%. The replacement
dierent age, experience, or even education groups within each of these two groups makes relatively little
dierence in the immigration context (see Card, 2009 for an overview of these evidence).
9See e.g., Gollin (2002) and Krueger (1999).
10See e.g., Greenwood et al. (1997) and Epstein and Denny (1980).
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ratio in our model economy is larger than the 40% suggested by Shimer (2005), which
does not account for the value of leisure or home production, and closer to the 71%, esti-
mated by Hall (2006), which accounts for both the value of leisure and home production.
Finally, the search cost parameter is set to hLI = 1:32 so that each unskilled immigrant
receives a wage that is 75% of that of an unskilled native. The targeted wage gap between
immigrants and natives lies in the middle of estimates reported in Borjas (2000).
5.2 Results
Using data from the US Census Bureau (Release Date: December 22, 2008) we nd that
over the period July 2000-July 2008 the average population growth rate, resulting from
international immigration, was approximately 0.35 percent. Using this growth rate, we see
that the immigration-induced change in US population over a twenty-year period would
be 7 percent. In Table 2 we summarize the eects of an unskilled immigration inux of
the same magnitude.11 We report results in the general model, but for comparability, we
also report results in three alternative specications. In the rst, we keep the proportion
of unskilled natives xed at  = 0:75, as calibrated above, and set hLI = 0. There are
therefore only price eects in this case. In the second, we keep the assumption hLI = 0,
but allow for  to adjust endogenously. Finally, in the third, we set hLI = 1:32, as
calibrated above, and keep the proportion of unskilled natives xed by setting  = 0:75.
In all specications the impact of immigration on the overall welfare of natives is
positive. When natives and immigrants face identical search costs, the increase in the
number of unskilled immigrants raises the overall welfare of natives, but, as expected,
mainly because it lowers the unemployment rate and raises the wage of skilled natives.
As derived in Proposition 4, when hLI = 0, an unskilled immigration inux has a negative
impact on unskilled natives both in terms of wages and unemployment, because it deters
low-skill job entry by lowering the price of the unskilled labor input. By contrast, when
we allow for dierential search costs, the increase in the number of unskilled immigrants
raises job entry not only in the high- but also in the low-skill sector. Consequently,
unemployment falls not only among skilled, but also among unskilled workers. In addition,
the negative impact on the wage of unskilled natives is smaller in this case. As for the
skilled natives, both the decline in their unemployment rate and the increase in their wage
11In conducting their simulation exercises, Borjas and Katz (2007) and Ottaviano and Peri (2010) used
an immigrant inux that increased the size of the total workforce by 11.0% and 11.3%, respectively.
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is larger in the presence of dierential search costs.
These improvements come through the impact of search costs on the wage of unskilled
immigrants. As explained above, due to their higher search costs unskilled immigrants
receive lower wages than unskilled natives. For this reason, as the immigrants' share
of unskilled labor force increases, rms with low-skill vacancies anticipate that they will
have to pay lower wages on average. This encourages low-skill job entry. The resulting
increase in the unskilled labor input (YL) causes the price of skilled labor input to rise
(pH), thereby also encouraging the creation of skilled jobs.
The presence of endogenous skill accumulation has a positive and signicant impact
on the overall welfare of natives, but mainly because it lessens the negative impact on the
price of the low-skill labor input (pL). As derived in Proposition 5, a compositional shift
in the native labor force towards skilled workers acts to mitigate the negative (positive)
impact of intensied competition from unskilled immigrants on the price of unskilled
(skilled) input. These counteracting eects lessen the negative eect on unskilled natives,
but also lessen the positive eect on skilled natives. Nevertheless, since the latter capture
a smaller share of the labor force, allowing for endogenous skill accumulation improves
the impact of immigration on the overall welfare of natives considerably.
It is also worth commenting on the impact of the unskilled immigration inux on
the welfare of previous unskilled immigrants. Clearly, with identical search costs, im-
migration has the same consequences on unskilled workers, both in terms of wages and
unemployment, irrespective of their origin. But with dierential search costs the impact
of immigration in terms of wages appears to be more positive on unskilled immigrants
than natives. To understand why notice that an increase in market tightness inuences
the equilibrium wage through two channels: 1) through its impact on the marginal prod-
uct of labor and thus the price of the labor input; an increase in tightness lowers the
marginal product of labor, thereby lowering the worker's wage; 2) through its impact on
the worker's value of outside option. An increase in tightness raises the value of search,
thereby strengthening the worker's position in wage setting, and in turn, causing his wage
to rise. Since search is much costlier for immigrants than natives, this second channel is
much more important for the former, which explains why the impact of immigration on
their wage is more positive. For these workers, a small increase in their chances of nding
a job implies a much larger increase (in percentage terms) in their bargaining power and
in turn on their wage.
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6 Sensitivity Analysis
The results above are derived using the elasticities of substitution between the input
factors estimated by Krusell et al. (2000) and assuming that unskilled immigrants and
natives are perfect substitutes in the production of the unskilled input (YL). In this
subsection we rst examine how robust the general model's predictions are to alternative
values for the elasticities of substitution between capital and the skilled and unskilled
labor, respectively. Then, we employ a generalized function for the production of unskilled
input, and examine the sensitivity of our results to dierent degrees of substitutability
between native and immigrant unskilled labor.
6.1 Changing the Elasticity of Substitution between Labor and
Capital
For the nested CES production function, given in equations (2) and (3), the Allen-Hicks
elasticities of substitution between unskilled labor YL and the other two factors, skilled
labor YH and capital K are identical and given by LK = LH =
1
1  . The Allen-Hicks
elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and capital is a function of factor shares.
Following Krusell et al. (2000) and Ben-Gad (2008) we employ a simplied denition of
the elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and capital: HK =
1
1  .
In Table 3 we report results of the general model for dierent sets of values for the
parameters  and . As in Ben-Gad (2008), we consider a set where both elasticities are
low (LK = 1; HK = 0:5), a set where both elasticities are high (LK = 2; HK = 1),
and two sets where one elasticity is high and the other low, (LK = 1; HK = 1) and
(LK = 2; HK = 0:5). The results are qualitatively robust to our choices of LK and
LK . In all cases the impact of immigration is positive on the welfare of natives, because
it reduces the unemployment rate of both skilled and unskilled workers and raises the
skilled wage.
Moreover, the eect of immigration on skilled workers becomes more positive as the
degree of capital-skill complementarity increases (i.e., as  decreases). The increase in YL
due to the increase in unskilled immigration, raises the marginal product of capital and
thus its equilibrium level. The increase in capital raises the marginal product of skilled
labor and hence the price of the skilled labor input, pH , thereby encouraging high-skill
job entry and leading to higher skilled wages and smaller unemployment among skilled
workers. The higher the degree of capital-skill complementarity the more positive is the
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impact of an increase in capital on the marginal product of skilled labor, which explains
why at lower values of  the increase in the number of unskilled immigrants benets
skilled workers by more.
Similar reasoning explains why the eect of immigration on skilled workers becomes
more positive as the elasticity of substitution between skilled labor/capital and unskilled
labor declines (i.e., as  decreases). An increase in YL causes a larger increase in both the
marginal product of skilled labor and the marginal product of capital when  is small.
Consequently, given that skilled labor and capital are (Hicks-Allen) complements to each
other, at lower values of  the increase in pH due to an immigration-induced increase in
YL is larger.
6.2 Changing the Elasticity of Substitution between Natives
and Immigrants
To permit the elasticity of substitution between unskilled-native and unskilled-immigrant
labor input (YLN and YLI , respectively) to dier, we employ the following CES function
YL = [ Y

LN + (1   )Y LI ]
1
 (35)
where  is a positive share parameter and  determines the degree of substitutability
between the two labor inputs, YLN and YLI . In particular, based on the above specication
the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives is IN =
1
1  . As above,
inputs are sold in competitive markets. Thus, the prices pLN and pLI equal the marginal
products of YLN and YLI , respectively
pLN =  Y
1 Y  L Y
 1
LN
pLI = (1   )Y 1 Y  L Y  1LI (36)
The free entry condition in (27), the wage rates in (31) and the condition governing the
human capital decision in (29) change accordingly to take into account that the price of
unskilled input, pL, is now disaggregated into pLN and pLI .
In Table 4 we report results in this generalized model at dierent values for the pa-
rameter . As empirical basis for our choices of  we use the estimates reported in Ottavio
and Peri (2010). They rst partition workers into groups based on their education and
experience characteristics. Then, using a CES aggregator, similar to the one in (36) they
estimate the elasticity of substitution between natives and immigrants sharing similar ed-
ucation and experience characteristics. Based on their estimates and given our denition
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of unskilled workers, IN should range from about 6.5 to about 20, meaning that  should
lie somewhere between 0.85 and 0.95. In lack of a good empirical estimate that can guide
our choice of value for  , for the results below we set  = 0:6. This value ensures that,
given the other parameters of the model, the productivity of unskilled natives is greater
than that of unskilled immigrants. We keep the rest of the parameter values as described
above.
Our results are robust to this generalized set-up. Again, unskilled immigration raises
the welfare of natives, because it lowers their unemployment rates and raises their average
wage. Also, the smaller the degree of substitutability between native and immigrant
unskilled labor, the larger the positive impact of immigration on both labor types. In
fact, for low values of  (i.e., lower degree of substitutability) unskilled immigration has a
positive impact on unskilled natives not only in terms of unemployment, but also in terms
of wages. This is not surprising since a smaller degree of substitutability between unskilled
natives and immigrants implies a smaller negative impact on the marginal product of
unskilled natives following an increase in the number of unskilled immigrants. This also
implies smaller negative impact on their price pLN , and hence their wage, and larger low-
skill job entry. Reasoning as above, the resulting larger increase in the unskilled labor
input, YL, raises the price of the skilled labor input, pH , by more, thereby improving also
the consequences on skilled natives.
Notice also that as the degree of substitutability between native and immigrant un-
skilled workers falls, the wage eect on unskilled natives becomes more positive (turns
from negative to positive), whereas that on unskilled immigrants becomes less positive
(turns from positive to negative). Hence, a high degree of substitutability between immi-
grants and natives means that the competitive eects of additional immigrants fall more
heavily on immigrants themselves, thereby lessening the burden on natives.12 This occurs
because as the degree of substitutability between immigrants and natives decreases the
price eect of an increase in the number of unskilled immigrants becomes less negative on
unskilled natives and more positive on existing unskilled immigrants. That is, at smaller
values of  the negative eect on wLI through pLI is much higher in absolute value, while
the negative impact on wLN through pLN is much smaller in absolute value.
12The view that the competitive eects of additional immigrant inows are concentrated among im-
migrants themselves, lessening the negative impact on competing natives due to immigrants and natives
being imperfect substitutes is also supported by evidence reported in Card (2009) and Ottaviano and
Peri (2010)
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the eects of immigration on the native population in
a search and matching model, where search frictions generate unemployment and break
the link between marginal product and wages. Within this framework we have been
able to explicitly account for the unemployment and wage eects that come from the
impact of immigration on the availability of jobs. Most of the existing contributions to
the immigration literature overlook such eects by adopting a Walrasian market-clearing
determination of wages. Other features of the model we have developed that deserve at-
tention are: heterogeneity in terms of skills, which allows for the analysis of distributional
eects across dierent skill types; endogenous skill acquisition on behalf of natives, which
gives them the opportunity to react to the negative pressure of immigration; a general-
ized production technology, which requires both capital and labor and accounts for the
eects of immigration on input prices; and dierential search costs, which can explain the
equilibrium wage gap between otherwise identical native and immigrant workers.
Within the connes of our model we have shown that the inow of unskilled immigrants
has two countervailing eects on unskilled domestic labor. First, it lowers the marginal
product of the unskilled labor input, thereby discouraging the creation of unskilled jobs.
Second, it makes opening vacancies suited for unskilled workers more protable to rms,
because rms anticipate that they will be able to pay lower wages to immigrants that
have higher search costs. In our calibrated baseline economy, where we let unskilled im-
migrants and natives be perfect substitutes in production, we have found that the second
eect dominates leading to a higher availability of unskilled jobs and lower unemployment
among unskilled native workers. The higher availability of unskilled jobs also strengthens
their bargaining position in wage setting, which acts to mitigate the negative eect of
the immigration-induced fall in their marginal product on their wages. We have shown
that these results are robust under various choices of values for the production-function
parameters that drive the elasticities of substitution between the three inputs. We have
also shown that in a calibrated version of the model where unskilled natives and immi-
grants are imperfect substitutes in production, the inow of unskilled immigrants benets
unskilled native workers, not only in terms of unemployment but also in terms of wages.
In all cases that we have considered, the inow of unskilled immigrants improves the
labor market outcomes of skilled native workers, because it encourages the creation of
skilled jobs by raising the price of the skilled labor input. Moreover, we have found
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that despite the negative pressure on the wages of unskilled native workers the inow of
unskilled immigrants generates signicant welfare gains to the native population overall.
This suggests that a system of transfers from skilled to unskilled native workers together
with a less restrictive immigration regulation can make everyone better o. However,
before reaching such a conclusion, one should also take into account the fact that low-
income unskilled immigrants are likely to use the programs of the welfare state at higher
rates than natives and contribute less to it. In other words, immigrants may impose a net
scal burden on the host country. We leave this as a possible extension, which we plan
to undertake in the future.
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Appendix
Derivation of equations (17)-(24)
The change in the number of unemployed native-skilled workers (UHN) is given by the
dierence between the sum of new births (n(1 )) and break-ups (sHYHN) and the sum
of deaths (nUHN) and matches (m(H)UHN); that is,
_UHN = n(1  ) + sHYHN   [nUHN +m(H)UHN ];
where a dot over a variable denotes its time derivative. Likewise, the change in the number
of unemployed immigrant-skilled workers (UHI) is given by the dierence between break-
ups (sHYHI) and matches (m(H)UHI):
_UHI = sHYHI  m(H)UHI ;
Setting _UHN = 0 and _UHI = 0 and using the identities YHN +YHI = YH and YH +UHN +
UHI = 1  + IH yields equation (17). The other equations follow similarly.
Derivation of the system of equations (27)-(29)
Equation (4) can be written as
pL = 

+ (1  )

Q
YL
 1 
;
or after using (3)
pL = 
(
 + (1  )

x

K
YH

+ (1  x)
 


YH
YL
) 1 
: (A1)
Similarly, from (5) and (3) we get
pH = (1  )(1  x)

x

K
YH

+ (1  x)
 1 

8><>:


YH
YL
 
h
x

K
YH

+ (1  x)
i 

+ (1  )
9>=>;
1 

;
(A2)
and from (6) and (3)
pK = (1 )x
"
x+ (1  x)

K
YH
 # 1  8><>:


YH
YL
 
h
x

K
YH

+ (1  x)
i 

+ (1  )
9>=>;
1 

: (A3)
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Taking the ratio of (A2) to (A3) we have
pH
pK
=
1  x
x

K
YH
1 
; where pK = r + : (A4)
Moreover, taking the ratio of equations (17) and (18), we get
YH
YL
=
m(H)[n+ sL +m(L)](1  ) + IH
m(L)[n+ sH +m(H)]( ++IL)
: (A5)
Equations (10) and (13) imply that
JEij =
wij + siJ
U
ij
r + n+ si
: (A6)
Also, combining (A6), (13) and (15) we obtain
Sij =
1
1  
pi   wij
r + n+ si
: (A7)
Next, subtracting (11) from (12) and using (A7) yields yields the expression for the wage
rate
wij =
[r + n+ si +m(i)]pi + (r + n+ si)(1  )(bi   hij)
r + n+ si + m(i)
: (A8)
Substitute (A8) in (A7) to get
Sij =
pi   bi + hiI
r + n+ si + m(i)
; (A9)
Substituting (A9) and (15) in (9) and taking into account the free entry condition (13)
yields
pi = Bi where Bi  bi   (1  i)hiI + ci[r + n+ si + m(i)]
(1  )q(i) : (A10)
where it may be recalled that by assumption hiN = 0 for i = H;L and H = 1:
Next, substitute (A9) and (16) in (11) to get
(r + n)JUij =
m(i)pi + (r + n+ si)(bi   hij)
r + n+ si + m(i)
: (A11)
Combining equations (A1), (A5) and (A10) yields (27), where the expression for k follows
from (A4) and (A10). Similarly, combining (A2), (A5) and (A10) yields (28). Finally,
substituting (A11) in (1) we get (29).
Proof of Proposition 1.
Combining equations (27) and (28), we arrive at the following equation: 
BL

 
1    
1   =
h
BH
(1 )(1 x) [xk
 + (1  x)]  1 
i 
1    (1  )
; (A12)
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where BL; BH and k are dened in the main text. Simple dierentiation shows that BH
and k are both increasing functions of H : On the other hand, if hLI = 0, then BL is an
increasing function of L only. Rearranging equation (A12) we obtain
X =
	
	  (1  ) ; (A13)
where
X 

BL

 
1 
and 	 

BH
(1  )(1  x) [xk
 + (1  x)]  1 
 
1 
:
Equation (A13) denes a locus of H and L along which a rm is indierent between
opening a low-skill and a high-skill vacancy. This locus, which is labeled EP in Figure 2,
has negative slope:
dL
dH
jEP =
  (1 )
[	 (1 )]2
d	
dBH
dBH
dH
dX
dBL
dBL
dL
< 0:
Equation (29) denes implicitly a function  = l(H ; L); where l1 < 0 and l2 > 0:
Substituting the function  = l(H ; L) in equation (28) we obtain
pH(H ; L) = BH(H); (A14)
where @pH=@H < 0; @pH=@L > 0 and dBH=dH > 0: Equation (A14) denes a locus of
H and L along which a high-skill vacancy has zero expected prot. This locus, which is
labeled as OH in Figure 2, has the following properties:
lim
H!0
L = 0; lim
H!H
L =1, where H <1; dL
dH
jOH =
dBH
dH
  @pH
@H
@pH
@L
> 0:
Equations (A13) and (A14) determine the equilibrium values of H and L: To ensure an
intersection of the EP and OH curves in the positive orthant we must impose conditions
that guarantee that the intercept of the EP curve is positive. Let
	0 = lim
H!0
	(H) =
"
bH
(1  )(1  x)

x

x
(1  x)(r + )b

1 
H

+ (1  x)
  
1 
# 
1 
:
Notice also that
lim
L!0
X(L) =

bL

 
1 
; lim
L!1
X(L) =
 1 if  > 0
0 if  < 0
and
dX(L)
dL
=

> 0 if  > 0
< 0 if  < 0
:
Given these properties, existence and uniqueness is ensured if
bL

 
1 
<
	0
	0   (1  ) :
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Proof of Proposition 2. Setting  = 1 in equations (27), (28) we get
 = BL; (A15)
and
(1  ) (1  x) [xk + (1  x)] 1  = BH ; (A16)
where where BL; BH and k are dened in the main text. Thus, the equilibrium is described
by equations (A15), (A16) and (29). Equation (29) denes implicitly a function  = l(H ;
L); where l1 < 0 and l2 > 0: Substituting in (A15) and (A16) we obtain the two loci of H
and L along which a low- and a high-skill vacancy have zero expected prot, respectively.
These curves are labeled as LL and HH in Figure 3. The curve LL has the following
properties
lim
H!1
L = L; where L <1; and dL
dH
jLL =  
dBL
dH
dBL
dL
> 0:
The curve HH; on the other hand, is independent of L and hence vertical on the hori-
zontal axis. Given these properties, both existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium pair
(H ; L) are immediate.
Proof of Proposition 3. If hLI = 0 and  = 1 then the price of the unskilled input
is pL =  and equation (27) simplies to  = BL; which is independent of H and IL:
This equation is depicted by curve LL in Figure 3. Also, equation (28) simplies to
(1   )(1   x) [xk + (1  x)] 1  = BH and is independent of L and IL (see the curve
HH in Figure 3). It follows that the equilibrium pair of (H ; L) is independent of IL:
Derivation of equation (32)
If hij = 0 then equation (31) implies that wij = wi and equation (10) that J
F
ij = J
F
i 8j:
It follows then from equations (9) and (13) that
JFi =
ci
q(i)
:
On the other hand, (10) and (13) imply
JFi =
pi   wi
(r + n+ si)
:
Combining the last two equations yields
wi = pi   (r + n+ si) ci
q(i)
; i = H;L;
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and, after using (A10); (32).
Proof of Proposition 4. Dierentiating equations (28) and (A13) we obtain
dH
dIL
=
 1

dX
dBL
dBL
dL
@pH
@
@
@IL
D1
> 0 and
dL
dIL
=
(1 )
[	 (1 )]2
d	
dBH
dBH
dH
@pH
@
@
@IL
D1
< 0;
where
D1 =
1

dX
dBL
dBL
dL

dpH
dH
  @BH
@H

  (1  )
[	  (1  )]2
d	
dBH
dBH
dH
@pH
@L
< 0:
The results regarding the unemployment variables and the wage rates follow immediately
from equations (30) and (32).
Derivation of equation (33)
Substituting (A10) in (A11) yields
(r + n)JUij = bi +

1   cii: (A17)
Next substitute (A17) in (1) to get (33).
Proof of Proposition 5. Dierentiating (33) we obtain
d
dH
=   1
z(r + n)

1   cH < 0 and
d
dL
=
1
z(r + n)

1   cL > 0:
Next dierentiate equations (28) and (A13) to get
dH
dIL
=
 1

dX
dBL
dBL
dL
@pH
@
@
@IL
D2
> 0 and
dL
dIL
=
(1 )
[	 (1 )]2
d	
dBH
dBH
dH
@pH
@
@
@IL
D2
< 0;
where
D2 =
1

dX
dL

@pH
@H
+
@pH
@
d
dH
  @BH
@H

  (1  )
[	  (1  )]2
d	
dH

@pH
@L
+
@pH
@
d
dH

< 0:
Comparing these derivatives with the ones derived in Proposition 4, it follows that, start-
ing from the same equilibrium, the eect of a change in IL is smaller, in absolute value, on
both H and L when  is endogenously determined. The other results follow immediately
from equations (30) and (32).
Proof of Proposition 6. If  = 1 then equation (27) simplies to  = BL: If  is
exogenous (endogenous) then this equation involves L and IL (H ; L and IL): Similarly,
equation (28) simplies to  = BH ; which involves just H ; i.e., it is independent of L
and IL. Simple dierentiation shows that
dL
dIL
j xed =

(+IL)2
D
>
dL
dIL
j variable

(+IL)2
IL
(+IL)2
d
dL
+D
> 0:
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where
D =
cL
1  
m0(L)q(L)  q0(L)[r + n+ sL + m(L)]
[q(L)]2
> 0
The results regarding the unemployment variables (uH and uLN) and the wage rates (wH
and wL) follow immediately from equations (30) and (31).
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Table 1: Parameterization of the baseline model: general case
Technology
 = 0:0401;  =  0:495 Krusell et al. (2000)
 = 0:538; x = 0:800 The US average share of labor in total output
and capital-output ratio.
 = 0:10 Consistent with estimates for the US.
r = 0:004 The monthly interest rate.
Population
z = 91:5 Average share of US labor force with a BA degree. y
IL = 0:142; IH = 0:047 The US share of foreign born labor force and
share of foreign-born labor force with a BA degree. z
n = 0:0067 The average US natural rate of population growth: 1991-2000,
Ben-Gad (2007).
Matching and Separations
sL = 0:040; sH = 0:024, Average US job nding rate, separation rate and
M = 0:715 vacancy to unemployment ratio.
 = 0:5 Standard, within the range of estimates in
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
Vacancies and Unemployment
cL = 0:546; cH = 0:819 Less than 5% of output devoted to job creation activities and
proportional to unskilled and skilled wages, respectively.
bL = 0:339; bH = 0:488 Average US employment rate and college-plus
wage premium.
hLN = 1:32 The wage of an unskilled immigrant is 75% of that of an
unskilled native, Borjas (2000).
 = 0:5 Internalizes the search externalities.
y Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey.
z U.S. Census Bureau, 2009 American Community Survey.
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Table 2. The Effects of a 7% Unskilled Immigration-induced Increase
in Labor Supply
(Percentage Changes) 
    
No Human 
No Cost 
Human
No Cost 
No Human 
Cost
General
(Human-Cost) 
  Unskilled Natives 
LN
w -2.1 -0.6 -2.0 -0.5 
LN
u 2.3       0.7 -7.3 -8.4 
Unskilled Immigrants 
LI
w same as natives same as natives -1.1 0.8 
LI
u same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
     
L
ș -4.9 -1.5 17.7 20.7 
 Skilled  
H
w 4.5 1.3 5.0 1.6 
H
u -4.8 -1.5 -5.2 -1.8 
     
H
ș 11.1 3.2 11.9 3.9 
Overall Unskilled
L
w same as natives same as natives -2.9 -1.4 
L
u same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
Overall Natives
N
w 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.8 
N
u 1.0 -0.2 -6.8 -6.9 
Ȝ  -2.0  -2.0
Welfare1 1.1 2.3 1.5 2.7 
Welfare2 1.2 2.4 1.8 3.0 
Overall
w -0.8 -0.2 -0.7 -0.2 
u 1.6 0.4 -6.7 -6.9 
Welfare1 -1.5 -0.4 -2.0 -0.9 
Welfare2 -1.6 -0.5 -1.9 -0.8 
Notes: Human (No Human) means that there is (not) endogenous skill acquisition. 
Cost (No Cost) means that there are differential search costs between unskilled 
immigrants and natives. The variable w  indicates the wage rate, u  the unemployment 
rate, ș  the tightness in the labor market. The subscript L stands for unskilled, H  for 
skilled, N  for native and I  for immigrant. The term “welfare” refers to the welfare 
per member in the corresponding group. The measure “Welfare1” includes the 
unemployment benefits, whereas the measure “Welfare2" does not. 
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Table 3. Sensitivity of the Calibration Results with respect to  
Production Parameters in the General Model (Human-Cost) 
(Percentage Changes) 
    
0 ȡ 1 Ȗ
( 1,
LK LH
V V  
0.5)
HK
V  
0.5 ȡ 0 Ȗ
( 2,
LK LH
V V  
1)
HK
V  
0.5 ȡ 1 Ȗ
( 2,
LK LH
V V  
0.5)
HK
V  
0 ȡ 0 Ȗ
( 1,
LK LH
V V  
1)
HK
V  
  Unskilled Natives 
LN
w -0.7 -0.5 -0.5 -0.0 
LN
u -10.2 -4.7 -10.1 -5.7 
Unskilled Immigrants 
LI
w 1.5 -0.2 1.7 0.5 
LI
u same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
         
L
ș 26.0 10.7 25.9 13.1 
 Skilled Natives 
H
w 2.0 1.2 1.7 1.2 
H
u -2.5 -0.9 -2.1 -1.2 
     
H
ș 5.6 1.8 4.8 2.6 
Overall Unskilled
L
w -1.8 -0.9 -1.6 -0.5 
L
u same as natives same as natives same as natives same as natives 
     
Overall Natives
N
w 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.3 
N
u -8.3 -3.9 -8.2 -5.1 
Ȝ -2.2 -2.8 -1.8 -1.1 
Welfare1 2.5 4.4 2.0 3.4 
Welfare2  2.9 4.5 2.4 3.5 
     
Overall
w -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 
u -8.4 -3.6 -8.3 -5.1 
Welfare1  -1.0 -0.5 -1.3 -0.2 
Welfare2 -0.7 -0.5 -1.0 -0.2 
Notes: See Table 2. 
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Table 4. Sensitivity of the Calibration Results with respect to the Degree of  
Substitutability between Unskilled Natives and Unskilled Immigrants in the 
General Model (Human-Cost) 
(Percentage Changes) 
0.85 Ș
ı  ( 6.7)
IN
0.90 Ș
ı  ( 10)
IN
0.95 Ș
ı  ( 20)
IN
  Unskilled Natives 
LN
w 0.3 0.0 -0.3 
LN
u -13.4 -13.1 -12.8 
Unskilled Immigrants 
LI
w -3.1 -0.2 3.0 
LI
u same as natives same as natives same as natives 
       
L
ș 36.9 35.9 35.0 
 Skilled Natives 
H
w 2.0 1.8 1.6 
H
u -3.6 -3.2 -2.8 
    
H
ș 8.5 7.4 6.5 
Overall Unskilled
L
w -3.7 -4.0 -4.3 
L
u same as natives same as natives same as natives 
    
Overall Natives
N
w 1.3 1.1 0.8 
N
u -10.9 -10.6 -10.4 
Ȝ -1.4 -1.4 -1.3 
Welfare1 2.9 2.7 2.4 
Welfare2 3.6 3.3 3.0 
    
Overall
w -1.2 -1.5 -1.8 
u -11.1 -10.8 -10.5 
Welfare1 -2.5 -2.8 -3.0 
Welfare2 -2.0 -2.3 -2.6 
   Notes: See Table 2. 
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Figure 1. The Structure of the Model 
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Figure 2.  Steady-State Equilibrium without Search Costs  
Figure 3.  Steady-State Equilibrium with Search Costs and Perfect
Substitutability  
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